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David Card and Richard B. Freeman
Canada and the United States are as close economically and socially as any
pair ofcountries in the world. The two nations share similar cultural traditions
and enjoy comparable living standards. Both countries have highly educated
and skilled work forces, with similar industrial and occupational structures.
Many ofthe same firms and unions operate on both sides ofthe border. Large
American firms such as DuPont are Canadian-owned, while American multi-
nationals are active in virtually all areas ofthe Canadian economy.! The mas-
sive trade and capital flows that link the two economies promise to become
even greater in the wake ofthe 1988 Canada-U.S. free trade agreement.
Throughout the past century Canada and the United States shared similar
economic experiences. Both countries were major recipients ofEuropean im-
migration and capital flows; more recently, both have experienced large in-
flows of non-European immigrants. Both escaped the destruction of World
Wars I and II. Both had "baby booms" in the 1950s that produced comparable
demographic structures. And both developed broadly similar income security
and labor market regulations over the course ofthe twentieth century.
But against this backdrop of similarity are "small differences" in policies,
institutions, and economic outcomes. Although the United States initially led
Canada in the adoption of a universal social insurance system, Canadian in-
come maintenance programs are now more clearly redistributive than compa-
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rable U.S. programs. Labor legislation and health policies in Canada reveal a
greater reliance on collectivist solutions to economic problems. On the out-
come side, unemployment rates and union membership rates in the two coun-
tries have diverged over the past two decades. Unemployment rates, which
were nearly equal in the two countries in the 1950s and 1960s, were markedly
higher in Canada in the 1980s. Unionization rates, comparable in the 1950s,
were twice as high in Canada as in the United States by 1990. Family income
inequality and poverty rates both increased in the United States over the
1980s, while they fell in Canada.
The mix of differences and similarities creates a valuable "natural experi-
ment" for analyzing the effects of economic policy, institutions, and market
shocks on labor market outcomes. Ifone wants to study the impact ofdiffering
unemployment insurance, income maintenance, or labor laws on economic
behavior and outcomes, comparisons ofCanadian and U.S. experiences hold
out the promise ofrelatively straightforward inferences. A program that works
in one country stands a good chance of working in a similar way in the other
country because so much else is the same. Alternatively, if one wants to dis-
cover the sources ofdifferences in wage structures, unemployment, unioniza-
tion rates, or poverty, the basic similarities of the U.S. and Canadian econo-
mies make it easier to link the differences to specific causal factors.
Recognizing the potential for learning from each other, public policy de-
bates within Canada and the United States frequently refer to the experiences
of the other country to support or oppose particular initiatives. U.S. policy
analysts routinely point to the Canadian example in arguing for more activist
labor market or social policy. U.S. unionists look longingly at Canadian labor
laws. Canadian analysts often cite the United States as an exemplar ofreduced
government intervention in the labor market and in economic affairs more
generally. Liberals and social democrats worry about the viability ofCanada's
national health insurance and strong unions in a competitive international
market.
In short, while Canada-U.S. comparisons are not ideal laboratory-style
controlled experiments, they are highly credible sources from which to draw
conclusions about economic behavior and the effect of institutions and poli-
cies on outcomes. Yet despite widespread interest in how things work across
the border, detailed and systematic comparative studies of labor markets and
income maintenance programs in the two countries have been surprisingly
rare.
What are the principal differences in income inequality, poverty rates, un-
employment, and other labor market outcomes between Canada and the
United States in the 1980s? Can one plausibly relate these differences to dif-
ferences in labor market and income maintenance policies? How did Canada's
more redistributive policies affect economic outcomes in this difficult decade
compared to the United States' greater reliance on unrestricted market forces?3 Introduction
What are the economic effects and costs of the "small differences" between
Canadian and U.S. policy and institutions?
This volume seeks to answer these important questions. Some ofthe studies
begin with differences in specific policies-immigration (George J. Borjas),
unemployment compensation (David Card and W Craig Riddell), income
maintenance (Rebecca M. Blank and Maria 1. Hanratty)-and examine how
they have generated different economic outcomes. Other studies begin with
differences in outcomes-educational wage differentials (Richard B. Freeman
and Karen Needels), the extent ofunionism (Riddell), the dispersion ofearn-
ings (Thomas Lemieux)-and seek to relate those differences to policies, eco-
nomic shocks, and the operation of the labor market. The final chapter
(McKinley L. Blackburn and David E. Bloom) brings together several of
these themes in an overall comparison of income distributions in the two
countries.
All the studies in this research project employ a similar methodology-one
that has become feasible only with the recent computer data revolution in
economics. Each study analyzes detailed microdata on thousands of individ-
uals in Canada, the United States, or both countries, and bases its conclusions
on comparisons ofthese data.
It is difficult to exaggerate the value ofsuch data in a cross-country compar-
ison. At one stage, researchers interested in why economic outcomes varied
across countries were limited to aggregate statistics-twenty or thirty time-
series observations, or published means from government surveys-that per-
mitted only crude comparisons. Such limited data make it impossible to ex-
plore in depth how people in one country might respond to the incentives and
institutions in another, or to assess how different market institutions might
explain differences in outcomes. All too often, the addition of a few more
years of data or another control variable would overturn the conclusions
drawn from limited and highly collinear time series.
By contrast, the microdata sets available from Statistics Canada and the
U.S. Bureau ofthe Census-drawn from similar monthly labor force surveys,
annual supplementary surveys, and population censuses-permit an extraor-
dinarily rich portrait of the labor markets in the two countries. With compa-
rable information on tens of thousands of people differing only in country of
residence, we can draw stronger inferences about differences between Canada
and the United States than were previously possible. As a case in point, con-
sider Card and Riddell's analysis ofunemployment. They note that the diver-
gence in unemployment rates between Canada and the United States reflects a
change in labor supply behavior and argue that some Canadians with low
work attachment tailor their work effort to Canada's more generous unem-
ployment support program. In the absence of suitable microdata, it would be
impossible to document the divergence in individual labor supply behavior,
with the result that previous discussions of the unemployment gap have fo-4 David Card and Richard B. Freeman
cused on differences in the extent of macroeconomic recession and recov-
ery-differences that Card and Riddell reject as the prime cause ofthe differ-
ences in unemployment.
While any inference of individual behavior and market interactions from
nonexperimental data across countries is fraught with problems, detailed mi-
crodata on individual decision units give economists and policy analysts at
least a fighting chance of assessing whether "small differences" in policy and
institutions matter between the United States and Canada.
Outcomes and Policies
The starting point for our project is the differences in outcomes between the
Canadian and U.S. labor markets and in the institutions and policies that af-
fected those outcomes in the 1980s. Some ofthe differences between the two
countries arose only in the past decade, while others reflect longer-term
trends.
Table 1 gives a capsule summary ofthe aggregate differences in labor mar-
ket outcomes between the two countries. Line 1 illustrates the unemployment
gap between Canada and the United States that developed in the 1980s, by
comparing average decadal rates of unemployment. There are two possible
explanations for this gap: failure of employment to expand in Canada as rap-
idly as in the United States, and increased labor force participation in Canada
relative to the United States. The employment-population rates in line 2 show
a small difference favoring the United States, but line 3 shows an opposite
difference in labor force participation rates. After lagging the United States
for many years, labor force participation rates in Canada surpassed U.S. rates
in the 1980s. The gap in unemployment rates thus appears to be associated as
Table 1 Aggregate Labor Market Outcomes in Canada and the United States
in the 1980s
Difference,
Canada U.S. Canada - U.S.
Average, 1981-90
1. Unemployment rate 9.4 7.1 2.3
2. Employment-population rate 59.5 60.4 -0.9
3. Labor force participation rate 65.6 64.9 0.7
Average annual rate ofchange, 1979-90
4. Employment 1.8 1.6 0.2
5. Real hourly earnings in manufacturing 0.6 -1.2 1.8
6. Real compensation per employee 0.8 -0.2 1.0
Sources: Lines 1-4-Card and Riddell, table 5.1 in this volume. Lines 5-6--0ECD Economic
Outlook (June 1992), table 54,56,59.
Note: Real earnings and compensation are deflated by GNP consumption deflator.5 Introduction
much with increased labor force participation as with the failure ofthe Cana-
dian economy to generate jobs.
Lines 4-6 tum from decadal averages to growth rates over the 1980s. The
employment growth rates in line 4 actually show slightly faster job creation in
Canada, although we note that different beginning and ending dates would tip
the balance the other way. We infer that both Canada and the United States
had significant (and roughly comparable) employment growth in the 1980s in
contrast, say, to Western Europe. The growth rates ofreal earnings in lines 5
and 6 also favor Canada-though in both countries earnings growth rates fell
below the historical averages that gave North America one of the highest liv-
ing standards in the world. We make little of the Canadian advantage here,
because again other earnings series and other beginning and ending dates
would give somewhat different relative standings. For instance, microdata on
the earnings of family heads show earnings increasing more rapidly in the
United States than in Canada from 1979 to 1987. The evidence does not sup-
port the conclusion that either country had markedly superior growth in real
earnings or employment over the period, despite the emergence of an unem-
ployment gap.
Inequality and Poverty
It is well known that the distribution ofincome in the United States widened
substantially in the 1980s. Differentials between more- and less-educated
workers and between white-collar and blue-collar workers grew sharply. In-
equality also increased among those with similar nominal skills (Blackburn,
Bloom, and Freeman 1990; Katz and Murphy 1992; Murphy and Welch
1992). Rising inequality combined with stagnant average real wages, declines
in the real value of some economic transfers, and the continued growth of
single-parent families to produce increases in poverty rates, particularly
among children (Blank 1991). Did Canada have similar or different experi-
ences?
Table 2 compares the changes in the distributions ofearnings and income in
Canada and the United States during the 1980s. The estimated earnings gap
between male college graduates and male high school graduates in line 1
shows that Canada had a notably smaller increase in the college premium than
did the United States. The pattern among female wage earners is similar (Free-
man and Needels, chap. 2 in this volume). The measure ofearnings inequality
for male workers in line 2 (the variance of log earnings) shows that earnings
inequality was greater in the United States at the beginning ofthe decade and
that the intercountry difference grew over the 1980s. An even more striking
pattern is revealed in line 3, which shows that family income inequality-
measured by the Gini coefficient-actually fell in Canada at the same time it
rose in the United States. Other measures of family income inequality tell a
similar story (Blackburn and Bloom, chap. 7 in this volume).6 David Card and Richard B. Freeman
Table 2 Inequality and Poverty Outcomes in Canada and the United States in
the 1980s
Country 1979 1986/87 Change
1. Education premium: difference in log Canada 0.29 0.33 0.04
weekly earnings between male col- U.S. 0.23 0.39 0.16
lege graduates and male high school
graduates (adjusted)
2. Variance of log earnings ofprime- Canada 0.270 0.288 0.018
age male workers U.S. 0.286 0.320 0.034
3. Gini coefficient offamily income Canada 0.373 0.371 -0.002
U.S. 0.398 0.411 0.013
4. Poverty rate of nonelderly-headed Canada 7.8 7.1 -0.7
families (%) U.S. 9.0 11.6 2.6
5. Poverty rate of single-parent families Canada 31.5 25.9 -5.6
with children (%) U.S. 34.0 40.5 6.5
Sources: Line I-Freeman and Needels, table 2.2, in this volume. Line 2-Blackbum and
Bloom, table 7.10, in this volume. Line 3-Blackbum and Bloom, table 7.5, in this volume.
Lines 4-5-Blank and Hanratty (1992), tables 5 and 6.
Given comparable employment-population ratios and rates ofgrowth ofav-
erage earnings in the two countries, and the differing trends in the distribu-
tions of income and earnings, one would expect to find relatively slower
growth ofpoverty in Canada than in the United States. Lines 4 and 5 confirm
this expectation and in fact show an even stronger relative trend: poverty rates
fell in Canada over the 1980s while they rose in the United States. The relative
divergence was particularly striking for single-headed families with children.
Institutions and Policies
What about economic policies and institutions? Do they differ between
Canada and the United States in ways likely to explain the differing trends in
labor market outcomes and family incomes?
At the outset it is important to recognize that both Canada and the United
States are large and geographically diverse countries that operate under rela-
tively decentralized federal systems. Provinces or states playa role in deter-
mining labor market regulations and income support policies. Some provinces
of Canada are closer geographically and economically to nearby U.S. states
than to other parts of Canada. Similarly, some U.S. border states look more
like their nearest Canadian neighbor (in terms ofresources, climate, and eco-
nomic base) than like Mississippi or New Mexico. The province of Quebec
differs in laws, culture, and predominant language from either English-
speaking Canada or the United States.
Which particular policies are under federal as opposed to provincial or state
control often differs between the countries. Even where Canadian provinces
have considerable autonomy in determining laws or expenditures, however,7 Introduction
they often show less regional variation than the individual states. Income sup-
port payments in Canada, for instance, vary less across provinces than Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments vary across states or
regions in the United States. One important exception is labor law, which lies
largely under provincial rule in Canada but is determined by the Congress in
the United States (save for state and local employees).
Immigration policies in both countries are set nationally. Both Canada and
the United States altered immigration laws in the 1960s to allow greater in-
flows of immigrants from non-European source countries. The United States
adopted a policy that stressed family reunification, although admission ofref-
ugees and substantial inflows of illegal immigrants (Borjas, Freeman, and
Lang 1991) meant that immigrants admitted under the quota system made up
less than one-half of total immigrants in the 1980s. Canada adopted a point
system for allocating visas, designed to produce a more skilled immigrant
flow. These laws were later amended to allow a greater role for family reuni-
fication.
Following the example of the Wagner Act in the United States, Canadian
labor laws were substantially modified during and after World War II. Despite
this common heritage, Canadian laws have become more favorable to unions
as institutions have evolved and economic circumstances have changed.
Under Canadian law it is easier to unionize: in most cases, unions need only
obtain the signatures ofa majority ofworkers, and management has less scope
to express opposition to unionism. Firms cannot permanently replace strikers,
and legislation in some provinces makes even temporary strike replacements
illegal. Quebec has Western European-style extension of union contracts to
nonunion workers.
Whether because of differences in labor laws or other factors (Riddell,
chap. 4 in this volume), the unionization rates in the two countries have di-
verged from rough equality in the 1950s to a substantial difference in the
1980s. The overall union density in Canada remained fairly stable in the
1980s (although it fell slightly in the private sector), while the unionization
rate fell sharply in the United States.
Canadian and U.S. educational systems differ in )Vays that affect the supply
of highly educated labor. The Canadian system varies across provinces, with
high school graduation after 11 years ofschooling in some provinces and after
12 or 13 in others. These differences feed into different paths to a university
degree (a minimum of3 years ofuniversity in Ontario; 2 years ofCEGEP and
3 years of university in Quebec; 4 years of university elsewhere). In the
United States all states have 4 years ofhigh school and 4-year university pro-
grams.
Many more Canadian than U.S. students leave high school without com-
pleting the requirements to attend university, but many more attend vocational
and community college programs. In the 1960s the United States expanded its
higher education system more rapidly than Canada did, with the result that by8 David Card and Richard B. Freeman
1987 18 percent ofu.s. adults had 16 or more years of schooling compared
to only 12 percent of Canadian adults. At the other end of the spectrum 8
percent of Americans had less than 8 years of schooling compared to 14 per-
cent ofCanadians.
Canada's unemployment compensation system is more generous than the
United States' system, primarily because of its less restrictive eligibility re-
quirements and the longer duration of benefits. Unemployment benefits are
available for up to fifty weeks in Canada as opposed to only twenty-six weeks
in the United States, although the U.S. government often extends benefit du-
rations in major recessions. Less restrictive eligibility rules imply that a larger
share of unemployed workers are eligible for benefits in Canada than in the
United States. Benefits are also available for maternity leaves, sickness, and
training in Canada. Finally, the take-up rate among those eligible for benefits
is higher in Canada. For reasons that are poorly understood (Blank and Card
1991), many American workers fail to apply for the benefits available to them.
Like the unemployment insurance system, Canada's income support system
for nonelderly persons is broader than the U.S. system. Canada's means-
tested programs have wider eligibility and higher benefits than comparable
U.S. programs. And Canada has universal non-means-tested programs that
are not found in the United States. Canadian antipoverty transfer programs
include family allowances (child bonuses ofthe form found in much ofWest-
ern Europe), child tax credits, and, most important, social assistance to low-
income families and individuals. 2 Comparable U.S. programs (AFDC, food
stamps, and Earned Income Tax Credits) are more narrowly targeted and less
generous. In addition, Canada allows greater discretion for caseworkers in
determining benefits, making for a less bureaucratic and potentially more flex-
ible and personalized system.
The Major Theme
The results of the studies in this volume relating economic outcomes to
policies and institutions in the United States and Canada are striking. Al-
though the chapters were written and can be read independently, they tell a
surprisingly similar story that gives us the title for the book and shows the
interrelations among the various policies, institutions, and outcomes, which
make the book more than the sum of its parts. The most important theme in
the volume is that small differences matter. Albeit in different ways, the stud-
ies show that differences in safety-net systems, labor market regulations, and
labor market conditions have discernible effects on outcomes and explain a
substantial share of the differing labor market and income experiences of the
two countries in the 1980s.
2. The family allowance program was phased out as a universal program in Canada at the end
of 1992.9 Introduction
One reason why small differences matter is that individuals and institutions
respond in economically significant ways to incentives. Immigration patterns
between Canada and the United States, for example, show evidence of self-
selection consistent with the broader redistribution policies in Canada and
with Canada's point-based immigration system. Canadians who migrate to the
United States come from the upper part of the Canadian earnings and educa-
tion distributions, whereas Americans who migrate to Canada come from rel-
atively lower parts of the U.S. earnings and education distribution. The
greater emphasis on skills in Canadian immigration rules has produced a more
modest decline in the skills of immigrants compared to natives than in the
United States. Annual labor supply patterns suggest that individuals adjust
their work activity to the specific features of unemployment insurance sys-
tems. And changes in educational earnings differentials affect the pattern of
enrollment in colleges and universities.
A second reason why small differences matter is that they interact in various
ways. The convergence in educational attainments between Canada and the
United States in the 1980s, due in part to differences in the timing of expan-
sion of university education, contributed to the divergence in earnings dif-
ferentials and income inequality. The convergence in female labor force par-
ticipation rates likewise contributed to the relative rise in Canadian
unemployment rates. Differing trends in union membership rates contributed
to the divergence in earnings inequality. And differences in immigration poli-
cies brought a relatively more educated work force into Canada, with conse-
quences for the distribution of earnings. Some of these relations-between
stronger unions, unemployment, and income support-fit together in a sys-
tematic way that is consistent with a more collectivist and welfare-state ori-
entation in Canada. A thorough understanding of labor market and income
developments in the two countries thus requires an analysis of the full spec-
trum ofsmall differences between the countries.
The chiefempirical finding ofthe volume is that Canadian labor market and
income support policies mitigated against the 1980s trend ofrising inequality
that swept the United States. By leaning against the wind, Canada managed
to lower poverty rates during a decade when slow economic growth and struc-
tural economic and social change made it exceedingly difficult for less-skilled
individuals to maintain their living standards. This finding emerges most
clearly in the analyses of unemployment, poverty, and income distributions.
Simulations by Blank and Hanratty suggest that if the United States had
adopted Canada's welfare policies, it would have avoided the trend of rising
child poverty that has cast such a pall over the future of U.S. society. Black-
burn and Bloom's analyses show that Canada's income transfer system played
a major role in keeping family income inequality from rising. And Card and
Riddell's analysis of unemployment compensation suggests that the unem-
ployment insurance system encouraged some persons with limited skills and
labor force attachment to continue working justenough to maintain eligibility.
The finding that Canada's more activist labor market and income support10 David Card and Richard B. Freeman
policies successfully mitigated some of the adverse economic forces of the
1980s does not, ofcourse, mean that these policies were ideal or indeed desir-
able. After all, there is no such thing as a free lunch: these programs cost real
resources, which must be considered in evaluating their overall social merit.
Specific Findings
1. Canada's social safety net produced markedly lower poverty rates, espe-
cially for single-parent families, than did the United States' poverty pro-
grams, at a cost oftwo to three times the U.S. transfer expenditures.
As noted above, Canada's income support programs have higher benefit
levels and greater eligibility than the United States' comparable programs.
With poverty defined in the same manner, comparable U.S. and Canadian
survey data show that, despite modestly lower average income in Canada,
rates ofpoverty are lower than in the United States and the poverty gap-the
amount ofincome necessary to bring families to the poverty line-is smaller.
The difference in poverty rates is particularly large among single parents: 32
percent of single parents are poor in Canada, compared to 45 percent in the
United States (Blank and Hanratty, chap. 7 in this volume).
To see whether the lower rates ofpoverty can be attributed to differences in
policy, Blank and Hanratty compare U.S. and Canadian rates of poverty be-
fore and after government transfers, on the simplifying assumption that trans-
fers do not affect other sources ofincome. They find that the Canadian transfer
system is much more effective, reducing the poverty rate overall by 5.7 points
compared to the 1.9 point reduction attributable to the U.S. transfer system.
Among single-parent families, the transfer system lowers poverty by 14.3
points in Canada compared to 5.2 points in the United States.
Simulating the effect of applying Canada's transfer system to the United
States-by giving Americans the transfers they would have received had they
faced Canadian program rules and benefits-Blank and Hanratty find that the
Canadian transfer program would essentially eliminate poverty among chil-
dren in the United States. One possible problem with simulations like these is
that a more generous transfer program might increase pretransfer poverty by
reducing the work activity ofthose who receive the transfers. Blank and Han-
ratty show that this is unlikely to be important in the Canadian context, as one
might suspect, given rising labor participation rates in Canada. The cost of
the transfer program is not the indirect cost oflost labor supply, but rather the
direct expenses: Canada spends two to three times as much per person on
transfers as the United States does.
2. The divergence in Canadian-U.S. unemployment rates is due largely to
changes in the fraction ofnonworking time that is reported as unemployment.
Canada's unemployment insurance system induced workers with low labor
force attachment to offer low levels of labor supply, but differences between
the U.S. and Canadian unemployment insurance systems contributed little to
the rise in relative unemployment rates.11 Introduction
One way to obtain insight into the emergence of higher unemployment in
Canada than in the United States is to analyze changes in relative unemploy-
ment rates among individuals with similar weeks of work. A decomposition
ofunemployment among individuals with differing amounts ofweeks worked
during the previous year reveals a relative increase in the likelihood that Ca-
nadian family heads, especially women, report nonworking time as time spent
unemployed rather than out ofthe labor force. For instance, Canadian women
with 4 weeks of work in 1979 reported 8.2 weeks of unemployment, com-
pared to 4.5 weeks of unemployment reported by comparable U.S. women.
In 1986 women with the same work activity reported 16.6 weeks of unem-
ployment in Canada and 6.3 weeks ofunemployment in the United States-a
relative increase of6.6 weeks ofunemployment in Canada (Card and Riddell,
chap. 5 in this volume).
The effect of Canada's more generous unemployment insurance system is
revealed by the emergence of spikes in distributions of weeks worked at 10
and 12 weeks. Under the Canadian system, individuals in many regions are
eligible for unemployment insurance with a minimum of 10 or 12 weeks of
work a year. The relative increase in the fraction of Canadian workers with
this low level of annual labor supply, coupled with increases in reported un-
employment by these workers, accounts for part of the relative increase in
Canadian unemployment. Nevertheless, more generous unemployment bene-
fits are not the only cause of the increase in Canadian unemployment. Much
of the relative increase in male unemployment occurred among men with 0
weeks ofwork-a group with declining unemployment insurance recipiency
rates in Canada. In addition, the reductions in maximum unemployment in-
surance eligibility weeks in the late 1980s failed to reduce the high levels of
unemployment.
3. Educational earnings differentials increased less in Canada than in the
United States, in large part because ofthe greater relative increase in the sup-
ply ofcollege-educated workers in Canada.
One striking change in the American earnings distribution in the 1980s was
the huge increase in the differential between more- and less-educated workers.
This increase was particularly large among younger workers, who are more
likely to be on the active job market than older workers ensconced in their
careers. In Canada, educational differentials between university-educated and
high school-educated workers increased very modestly for both men and
women. Between 1979 and 1986/87 differentials rose by .16 log points for
25-64-year-old American men compared to .04 points for Canadian men ~nd
by .10 points for American women compared to .04 points for Canadian
women. Among 25-34-year-olds the increase for Canadians was .04 for men
and for women versus an increase for Americans of .21 (men) and .10
(women) (Freeman and Needels, chap. 2 in this volume).
Associated with differing trends in educational wage premiums were differ-
ing rates ofgrowth in the relative supply ofmore-educated workers in Canada
and the United States. In the U.S. labor force as a whole the trend rate of12 David Card and Richard B. Freeman
growth in the ratio of college to high school graduates decelerated over the
1980s. Among young male workers the ratio of college graduates to high
school graduates actually fell during the 1980s. By contrast, in Canada the
ratio of college to high school graduates increased rapidly. Using time-series
estimates of the effect of relative supplies on relative earnings, Freeman and
Needels estimate that the greater growth of the relative supply of educated
workers in Canada explains over one-half of the divergence in Canada-U.S.
educational differentials. Although other factors-differing shifts in labor de-
mand, greater unionization and income support in Canada-may also have
played a role, the effect ofsupply is consistent with evidence from other coun-
tries that relative supplies are a key determinant of relative earnings by edu-
cation (Freeman 1976; Katz and Murphy 1992; Schmidt 1992; Edin and
Holmlund 1992).
4. Income inequality among families increased in the United States but not
in Canada, in part because ofincreased transfer income in Canada and in part
because ofsmaller increases in earnings inequality.
The distribution of income among families depends on the age and size
composition of families, the number of earners, the distribution of earnings
among the employed, the distribution ofproperty income, the effect ofincome
transfer programs (including unemployment compensation), and the correla-
tions among these factors. Using several summary measures of the distribu-
tion of family incomes, Blackburn and Bloom show that inequality in family
incomes increased in the United States but not in Canada in the 1980s, and
decompose the differential pattern into its immediate causes.
The faster growth ofsingle-parent families in the United States than in Can-
ada contributed little to the relative change in family income inequality. In
fact, microdata show that inequality rose in almost all family types in the
United States but in almost no family type in Canada. Inequality oftotal fam-
ily earnings and earnings of full-time year-round male workers rose in both
the United States and Canada, ruling out a pure labor market explanation for
the differing trends in family income inequality. Nevertheless, the smaller in-
crease in earnings inequality for male workers in Canada (due to the slower
rise in education differentials, among other factors) ameliorated the rise in
income inequality among Canadian families.
The primary explanation for the differential trend in inequality was the dif-
ferential growth oftransfer income. Transfer income had a sizable equalizing
impact on the distribution of income in Canada but did little to offset the
forces producing income inequality in the United States. That income inequal-
ity fell among Canadian families headed by females, whose incomes are most
directly affected by transfer policy, while rising among U.S. families headed
by females provides strong support for this conclusion.
5. The higher rate of unionization in Canada than in the United States ac-
counts for a sizable part of the difference in earnings inequality between the
countries, and the divergence in unionization rates contributed to the more
rapid growth ofearnings inequality in the United States.13 Introduction
It is well established that unions reduce income inequality, in large part
through standardization ofwages within the organized sector (Freeman 1980).
Both Card (1991) and Freeman (1991) attribute about one-fifth of the recent
rise in male earnings inequality in the United States to the decline in unioniza-
tion. Not only can the higher unionization rate in Canada potentially explain
part of the Canadian-U.S. difference in earnings inequality, but the diverging
trend in unionization between the countries ought to account for some of the
divergence in earnings inequality in the 1980s.
Using cross-section and longitudinal data on Canadian earnings and union
membership, and comparing these data with Card's (1991) analysis for the
United States, Lemieux shows that these expectations are correct. The effect
ofunions on the distribution ofearnings depends on the size ofthe union wage
premium, the position of organized workers in the nonunion earnings distri-
bution, and the effects of unions on inequality within the organized sector.
Lemieux finds that unions in Canada have similar relative wage effects to
those in the United States, and similar effects on the extent ofwage inequality
among union workers. In both Canada and the United States, private sector
unionization rates are highest for workers in the middle of the skill distribu-
tion. In Canada, however, the high level of unionization among public sector
workers implies that unionization rates in the economy as a whole rise with
skill levels. Taking all these factors into account, Lemieux shows that in Can-
ada as in the United States the presence of trade unions reduces the variance
ofearnings among men. About 40 percent ofthe Canadian-U.S. difference in
earnings inequality is due to difference in unionization. In contrast, unioniza-
tion raises inequality among Canadian women relative to their U.S. counter-
parts.
Studies that infer union wage effects from cross-section data are subject to
the problem of selectivity of union members along unobservable dimensions.
Lemieux's analysis of longitudinal changes in the wages of workers who in-
voluntarily lose their jobs and switch union status shows that correcting for
selectivity in this manner has little effect on the estimated pattern of union
wage differentials but does substantially reduce the estimated effect of unions
on the dispersion of earnings in the union sector. However, he attributes this
to the peculiarities of the small sample of changers and concludes the cross-
sectional differences give better estimates of the union effect on within-group
variance.
Given the approximate seven-point drop in union density in the United
States relative to Canada in the 1980s, as much as 45 percent of the relative
increase in the variance of earnings among U.S. men can be attributed to the
differential trend in unionization.
6. Union coverage is approximately twice as high in Canada as in the
United States, an outcome that is largely attributable to the higher probability
that Canadian workers who desire union representation are unionized.
The differential rate of unionization in Canada and the United States has
aroused considerable debate among labor specialists, in large part because of14 David Card and Richard B. Freeman
the implications for policy. Four hypotheses have been offered to explain the
differential patterns and trends. First is the claim that differences in union rates
result from differences in economic structure: U.S. unionization is falling, as
employment shifts to traditionally nonunion private sector industries, whereas
Canada's greater governmental employment buttresses the unionization rate.
By calculating unionization rates for workers classified by gender, age, indus-
try, occupation, public or private sector employment, and education, Riddell
shows that this explanation ofthe differing rate ofunion density is false. Com-
parable differences in union rates are found in all groups. A second hypothesis
is that the U.S.-Canada gap in union coverage is due to differences in social
attitudes toward unions: Canadians like unions and Americans do not. Survey
data on whether people think unions are good or bad or whether they approve
or disapprove of trade unions show no difference in attitudes or in trends in
attitudes, indicating that this explanation is also false.
Two serious contenders for explaining the different level and trend remain:
U.S. workers have less desire for unions than do Canadian workers, and U.S.
employers and/or institutions afford workers less possibility for organizing
unions when they want to organize, compared to Canadian employers/institu-
tions.
Riddell puts these explanations in the context of a demand-supply frame-
work (developed by Farber [1983]), in which workers demand union repre-
sentation, and firms and labor market institutions supply union jobs. Compar-
ing Canadian and U.S. surveys on the desire for unionization, he finds that
desire for union representation is about 28 percent higher in Canada than in
the United States, but that the bigger difference between the two countries is
in the higher Canadian unionization rate conditional on the desire for unions.
OfCanadians who want to be unionized, 76 percent are in unions, compared
to 44 percent of Americans, a difference that remains after controlling for
differences in the characteristics of workers. Although Riddell does not ex-
plore the reasons for this difference, an obvious candidate is the difference in
labor laws and institutions that permit U.S. management greater opportunity
to deter unionization through hostile actions (Freeman 1988; Weiler 1990).
7. Canada's point-based immigration system produces a more skilled flow
of immigrants than the United States' family unification-based system,
largely because it draws more immigrants from industrialized European coun-
tries.
Changes in immigration laws in Canada and the United States in the 1960s
were associated with changes in skill composition ofimmigrants. In the early
1960s immigrants to Canada had fewer years of schooling than those to the
United States (though more schooling than native-born Canadians). By the
1970s this situation had reversed: immigrants to Canada averaged nearly a
year more of schooling than immigrants to the United States. In addition,
largely because of the relative difference in schooling, the immigrant-native
earnings gap was greater in the United States than in Canada in the 1970s.15 Introduction
Immigrants from the same source country tend to have about the same educa-
tion and relative earnings in the United States and in Canada. Consequently,
the main explanation for the differing education and earnings of immigrants
in the two countries is the national origin ofimmigrants. Although the fraction
ofimmigrants from Asia and Latin America increased in both countries, Can-
ada maintained a larger share of European immigrants, presumably because
they better fit the skills requirement for Canadian visas.
Costs ofTransfer Policies
As noted, the conclusion that Canada's labor market institutions and in-
come support programs have reduced income inequality and lowered poverty
rates does not mean that they are better or more successful than comparable
U.S. institutions and programs. Canadian transfer programs expanded
through the 1980s in a period of sluggish economic growth. This expansion
came at the costofhigher taxation rates and sharp relative increases in govern-
ment indebtedness in Canada.
The expansion oftransfer spending in Canada in the 1980s and the dramatic
comparison with U.S. trends over the decade are illustrated in table 3. Here
we give a thirty-year perspective on social spending for three main sets of
transfer programs: needs-based cash and in-kind transfers for the nonelderly
(including payments to blind and disabled individuals but excluding medical
payments); unemployment insurance; and cash-based child support programs
(Family Allowance and Child Tax Credit programs in Canada, Earned Income
Tax Credits in the United States). These programs account for virtually all of
Table 3 Transfer Program Expenditures in the United States and Canada, 1960-90
(percentage ofGNP)
Country 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990a
1. Need-based transfers in- Canada 0.66 0.98 1.37 1.69 1.76 2.15 2.20
cluding disabledb U.S. 0.80 0.89 1.10 1.72 1.70 1.40 1.30
2. Unemployment insurance Canada 1.22 0.54 0.78 1.81 1.28 2.13 1.77
U.S. 0.59 0.44 0.38 0.87 0.68 0.46 0.32
3. Child programs: tax credits Canada 1.36 1.05 0.63 1.06 0.86 0.82 0.77
and family allowancec U.S. 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.09
4. Sum of three programs Canada 3.24 2.57 2.78 4.56 3.90 5.10 4.74
U.S. 1.39 1.33 1.48 2.65 2.43 1.90 1.71
Sources: For Canada, Canada Year Book (1980-81, 1991). For the United States, Social Security Bul-
letin Annual Statistical Supplement (1991); 1992 Green Book.
a1990 data for Canada; 1989 data for the United States.
bCanadian data include expenditures under the Canada Assistance Program and earlier programs for
disabled people, as well as provincial and municipal welfare. U.S. data include AFDC, SSI, food
stamps, general assistance, and other categorical payments under the Social Security Act excluding
Medicaid expenditures.
cCanadian data include FA and CTC. U.S. data include the refunded portion of EITC.16 David Card and Richard B. Freeman
the measured transfer income of individuals and families in the two countries
(see Blank and Hanratty, chap. 6 in this volume), although they ignore gov-
ernment spending on health care, housing, and education.
Spending on need-based transfers (line 1) shows a rising trend in both the
United States and Canada during the 1960s and 1970s. Although spending
was lower in Canada in 1960, by 1975 the percentages of national income
devoted to needs-based transfer programs was about equal in the two coun-
tries. During the 1980s spending rose sharply in Canada (a 25 percent increase
to 2.2 percent ofGNP), while it fell sharply in the United States (a 25 percent
cut to 1.3 percent ofGNP).
Line 2 of table 3 shows that spending on unemployment insurance pro-
grams was higher in Canada than in the United States throughout the 1960s
and 1970s. Nevertheless, the relative ratio of spending was roughly con-
stant-at about 2 : I-from 1960 to 1980. During the 1980s Canada again
had a large increase in spending, while the U.S. unemployment insurance
program contracted. By the close ofthe decade Canadian spending on unem-
ployment compensation was five times greater as a fraction of national in-
come.
The entries in line 3 show that expenditures on Child Tax Credit and Family
Allowance have declined in Canada over the past three decades. Spending on
tax credits in the United States, by comparison, actually rose over the 1980s
(albeit from a very modest base). As in the previous lines, however, the main
contrast is in the substantially higher level of spending in Canada. When the
three sets of programs are added together (in line 4 of the table), the higher
overall level ofCanadian spending and the divergence in spending trends after
1980 stand out very clearly.
How has Canada financed its more generous transfer spending? The answer
is revealed in figures 1 and 2, which show average "taxation" rates (total gov-
ernment tax revenues divided by total income) and government borrowing
rates (total government budget deficits divided by total income) in the two
countries.3 During the past two decades total government revenues followed
roughly parallel trends in the two countries. Throughout the period Canadian
governments collected about 5 percentage points more of national income.
The two countries also had similar (and relatively small) net government bor-
rowing rates in the early 1970s. In the late 1970s and especially after 1980,
however, government borrowing increased sharply in Canada relative to the
United States. Although the borrowing gap narrowed in the late 1980s, it is
clear that Canada paid for its relative expansion in government spending
through larger deficits, transferring the burden of this spending to future tax
liabilities.
3. We define government spending to include all levels ofgovernment: federal, provincial, and
local in Canada: federal, state, and local in the United States. Comparisons ofthe level ofgovern-
ment spending in the two countries are affected by the composition ofhealth care spending, which
is mostly government spending in Canada.17 Introduction
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Fig. 1. Government revenue as percentage ofGDP, United States and
Canada, 1970-88
Sources: For the United States, GDP data are from the Economic Reportofthe President
(1992), table B-1; government expenditures data (for all levels ofgovernment) are from
Statistical Abstract ofthe United States (1982-83 to 1991). For Canada, GDP data are from
Statistics Canada, National Income and Expenditure Accounts Annual Estimates, 1926-86
(1988) and Bank ofCanada Review (July 1992), Table H-2; government expenditures data (for
all levels ofgovernment) are from Canada Year Book (1975-1988) and International Monetary
Fund, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (1991).
Neither source of funding is costless: both taxes and deficits introduce a
variety of distortions, which add to the inefficiency of the economy (Romer
1988). Whether the cost oftransfer spending in the United States orCanada is
greater or less than the benefits created by this spending is beyond the scope
of this volume. We note that in the late 1970s the two countries were much
closer in the fraction of incomes raised as taxes, borrowed, and spent on in-
come transfer programs. Over the 1980s they diverged, with some ofthe con-
sequences we have documented here.
Conclusion
The 1980s provided a challenging period in which to judge the effects of
more and less activist policy on diverse economic outcomes. It was a decade
that featured both the highest unemployment rates and the longest peacetime
recovery since the Great Depression. Even with the lengthy recovery, produc-
tivity growth was sluggish and unemployment rates never fully recovered to
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I-a- United States --.- Canada
Fig. 2. Government Deficit as percentage ofGDP, United States and Canada,
1970-88
Sources: See figure 1.
relative labor supplies, opening of trade-made it difficult for less-skilled
workers throughout North America to compete and survive. The United States
chose to give relatively free play to market forces during this decade. Canada
chose a more activist strategy of providing broader social safety nets and
labor regulations and institutions more favorable to trade unionism. U.S. pol-
icies generated substantial employment growth but did little to mitigate mar-
ket forces that redistributed income toward higher-income workers and fami-
lies. Canadian policies generated comparable employment growth but also
mitigated the forces that tended to increase inequality and poverty. The expe-
riences of the decade suggest that policy differences-even small differ-
ences-can matter in economic outcomes, albeit with associated costs. With
a modestly different set of policies, the United States could have had labor
market and income outcomes comparable to those in Canada. With a modestly
different set of policies, Canada could have looked more like the United
States. The reasons why the two countries chose different strategies for coping
with the problems of the 1980s, and the longer-run consequences of these
choices, lie beyond the scope of our project, though they are certainly inter-
esting to explore.19 Introduction
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